Anglo-saxon institutes in International tran sport conventions referring to the carriers’ liability and the  position of continental lawyers by Jerman, Boris
43
1. INTRODUCTION
Liability for damages represent the kind of relationship of obligation 
wherein one party of the relationship (liable person) is bound to compen-
sate for damage another party (injured party), who is entitled to such com-
pensation1. Liability for damages represents a civil sanction, which can be 
exercised by the other party of the legal relationship who suffered dam-
age. A common characteristic of all civil sanctions is that they interfere in 
the property of a liable party and not in his personal status. 
 In the theory and court practice of different countries there are very 
precisely elaborated institutes of liability. Although within each legal sys-
tem there exists some question regarding different legal aspects regarding 
the institutes of liability, they represent a challenge for theoretical discus-
sions rather than obstacles in practice. The real problem in practice arises 
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in cases involving institutes of liability from different legal systems2 and 
above all when they involve institutes of Anglo-Saxon and Continental 
law system3.
 The problem in interpretation of legal institutions from different legal 
systems became relevant in the twentieth century with globalisation of 
world trade. One of the first areas of this kind was transport, wherein the 
first international conventions regulating the carriers’ liability appeared4. 
A lot of institutes of Anglo-Saxon law entered into these conventions, 
which were not known to the lawyers of the Continental law because they 
were developed under specific circumstances which were not present in 
Continental law. This is a difficult situation for Continental lawyers. To 
overcome such a situation they had mostly been making attempts to find 
out which institutes of Anglo-Saxon law in the international conventions 
are comparable with those of Continental law. The main reason for the 
dilemma is that many Anglo-Saxon institutes in international transport 
With the emergence of national states after the absolutist period national states recog-
nized no other law other than their own.  As a consequence, legal customs were pushed to 
the bottom of the legal hierarchy.  Private law and especially lex mercatoria was national-
ized: it entered in the commercial codes, on the basis of which the states introduced their 
vision of the law (Galgano, F., Lex mercatoria, Società editrice il Mulino, Milano, 2001, p. 
109). In Europe, such a situation led to the emergence as many legal systems as states (P. 
Grilc, Lex mercatoria in mednarodno gospodarsko pravo, Podjetje in delo, 1998, p. 685).  
In the legal books from the Anglo-Saxon area the expression common law is used  to refer 
to the legal system from the Anglo-Saxon territory, while civil law refers to the legal sys-
tems in use in Continental Europe. In this article the expression Anglo-Saxon law will be 
used for the law deriving from the Anglo-Saxon area;  for the law deriving from the Conti-
nental Europe on the other hand will be used the expression Continental law. 
Common law can not be used as the general notion for the law deriving from the Anglo-
Saxon world for historical reasons. The branches of English law were traditionally con-
nected to the particular court organisation. From the traditional division of English law 
till the reform in the 19th century the narrowness of Common law (Common law represented 
a group of legal rules, which were used by courts of Common Law till the 1873: Court of Com-
mon Pleas, King’s Bench and Court of Exchequer) was evident, which was only one of the legal 
branches. Besides Common law existed: 
- Admiralty law which represented the rules in principle used by the Court of Admiralty,
- Equity as a group of legal rules used by the Court of Chancery and,
- Family law(hereditary and the law of  marriage) was applied by sacral courts. 
Reforms in the 19th century secularised family law whereas the other three law branches 
were unified by reforms in such a way that they were incorporated in the frame of High 
Court of Justice. (P. Vlačič, (Ne)upravičenost omejitve višine odgovornosti v prevoznem pravu, 
2005, p. 15-16). 
Also the expression Civil law is not an adequate expression for the law present in Conti-
nental Europe because it  comprehends the law which regulates the relationships between 
the private persons and not all the law branches which exist on the continent.
The first conventions were the conventions of the Committee Maritime International 
(CMI): the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law Relating to Assistance 
and Salvage at Sea, 1910 and International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules 
of Law Relating to Collision Between Vessels, 1910.  
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conventions represent the standard of carriers’ conduct or a situation in 
which he can no longer limit his liability. Therefore the Continental law-
yers are interested in defining institutes of Continental law which contain 
the same or similar standards of conduct. 
 The method of comparison can only be partly successful because not 
every institute of Anglo-Saxon law has its comparable institute in Con-
tinental law. The question arises whether Anglo-Saxon law without cor-
relative institutes in Continental law should be interpreted as they are in 
Anglo-Saxon law or whether Continental law can infuse them with mean-
ing grounded on its own institutes. 
2. Liability in continental law 
The continental system of liability is based on two main types of liabili-
ties: fault liability and strict liability. 
 Fault liability represents the relation of the person causing damage to-
ward the consequence.  This relation has many stages. 
 The highest degree of fault liability is intention. It includes not only 
the will to cause the act of damage but also the consciousness that the act 
is noxious for the rights of a third person5. The intent can have different 
extremes. One of them is when a certain conduct is at the start evaluated 
as likely to bring about the damage, person acts completely wrong and in-
different to the probability of damage being caused6. Such type of intent is 
called also eventual intent, which differs from direct intent; in the frame 
of the latter the actor is not indifferent towards the consequence - he is 
very interested that the consequence arises7. The division between direct 
and eventual intention is more important in criminal law than in civil 
law, where few cases exist when the grade of intention is important in de-
termination of the amount of estimation of civil compensation8.
 A less strict degree of liability is negligence, which represents omis-
sion to do something that should  be done by the person who disposes 
with certain skills and knowledge. There are several forms of negligence. 
F. Cancelli in Enciclopedia giuridica, XIII. Volume, 1964, p. 712.
P. Cendon in Digesto delle discipline privatistiche, 1991, p. 37.S. 
Cigoj, Teorija obligacij, 1989, p. 184.
In the Slovenian Obligation Code intention is not mentioned, but it should be respected 
in the case of defining the compensation (recourse) of joint and several debtors (Obliga-
tion Code Art. 208). In such a situation the intensity of intention of each joint and several 
debtor should be respected, which means that the compensation is greater when damage 
is caused by the direct intention than in the cases caused by eventual intention. 
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Irrespective of  which form of negligence is  referred to, common to all 
the types of negligence is that a consequence is not desired and that a cri-
teria to estimate certain conduct as negligence is abstract9. Conduct of the 
person causing damage is compared with an imaginary third person who 
conforms to the standard of correct conduct in a certain circumstance10. 
This standard can be a ‘usual’ person, a reasonable man, a good master, ex-
pert, etc. In estimating these standards it is very important to elaborate all 
circumstances in which a certain person caused damage and than on the 
basis of standards which are relevant for the case in which damage was 
caused to estimate whether he acted correctly or neglected his duties. 
 A typical aspect of Continental law is the graduation of negligence. The 
highest degree of negligence is gross negligence (culpa lata) which signi-
fies the lack of the kind of care which is expected from each person. Less 
strict is ordinary negligence (culpa levis), which means the failure to use 
that degree of care which the ordinary or reasonably prudent person would 
have used under the circumstances and for which the negligent person is 
liable. Besides gross and ordinary negligence exists also slight negligence 
(culpa levissima). It represents the failure of care which is expected from an 
extraordinary careful person. 
 In the civil codes of Continental law systems two types of  fault liabil-
ity exist: the fault liability where the burden of proof is on the claimant 
and presumed fault liability. The first type prevails and entails that the 
plaintiff should prove all the elements of liability including the fault11. In 
the second type of fault liability the claimant need not prove the fault of 
the wrongdoer, because the latter should prove that there was no fault on 
his side for the damage caused. Up to this moment his fault is presumed. 
Presumed fault liability is a basic type of liability in very few Continental 
law legal systems12. Presumed fault liability is very present in the area of 
maritime transport in both legal systems: Anglo-Saxon and Continental, 
and it was introduced by the Hague rules13. 
S. Cigoj, supra 7, p. 185.
Ibidem.
The elements of fault liability are: injurious event, causation between the act of the wrong-
doer and damage caused, inadmissible damage, and fault. – Ivi, p. 173
Presumed fault liability is a basic type of liability in the region of former Yugoslavia and 
it was introduced by the Code of  obligation relationship (ZOR), which defines a person 
who causes damage to another liable unless he proves that the damage appeared without 
his liability (154. čl. Obligation). When a new Obligation code in Slovenia was accepted it 
preserved presumed fault liability. 
S. Carič, T. Miodrag, I. Grabovac, D. Požar, I. Jankovec, V. Filipović, P. Sulejić, P. Stanković, 
Transportno pravo, 1979, p. 151.
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Besides fault liability there is also strict liability, which represents liability 
irrespective of fault. The liable person becomes the person under the ob-
ligation in all situations when his conduct is in causation with the dam-
age. In the legislation such a type of liability can be found in the case of 
dangerous activity. Today there exists relative strict liability, meaning that 
there exist reasons for exculpation. In most cases these reasons are: force 
majeure14, act of a third person, act of war, act of  Government etc15. For all of 
the above mentioned reasons of exculpation, another condition should be 
present, i.e. that they are an inevitable and unexpected occurrence.
3. LIABILITY IN ANGLO-SAXON LAW
In Anglo-Saxon law there also exist two main types of liability: fault li-
ability and strict liability.
 Fault liability assumes three forms: malice, intention (including reck-
lessness) and negligence16. Malice is the most reprehensible state of mind. 
It has assumed different meanings in different contexts, but it could 
broadly be equated to spite17. In the conduct by malice enters: malicious 
prosecution, malicious abuse of process, malicious falsehood, etc.    
 Intention signifies the state of mind of a person who foresees and de-
sires a particular result. In tort law there are three main groups of torts 
requiring intention (a) the torts having their origin in the old writ of tres-
pass which protects personal liberty and security (b) fraud and injurious 
falsehood (c) a group of torts which protect against interference with con-
tractual relations and trade18. 
 Negligence represents omitting to do something which a reasonable 
man, guided by those ordinary considerations which ordinarily regulate 
human affairs, would do, or doing something which a reasonable and pru-
In Continental law there exist two concepts of  force  majeure: German and Roman. The German con-
cept considers  force  majeure as an extraordinary event, external to an enterprise, which is unforese-
eable and can not  be  averted even by using the greatest possible care, and  which  does not  have to 
be  taken  account  of  and allowed for by the party concerned by reason of  its frequency  (A. Messent, 
A.  D. Glass, CMR: Contracts  for  the  International  Carriage  of  Goods by Road, Second Edition, 1995, p. 114). 
The Classic Roman concept  of  force  majeure is different. There is no distinction between force  majeu-
re and coincidence, so the externality of  the enterprise is not  a necessary condition in defining  for-
ce  majeure. Such an  understanding  of   force  majeure in  the first  commentary of  the Napoleonic  Code 
thus  equated the two (A. Candian  in   Nov.  digesto  italiano, II. Vol., UTET,  Torino, 1957, p. 989).
Different regulations can contain different reasons for exculpations in case of strict  liability. Of 
the international transport conventions the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil 
Pollution Damage  which in its  Art. 3 (2) defines that  no liability for pollution damage  shall be atta-
ched to the owner  if  he  proves that the damage:  (a) resulted from an act of war, hostilities, civil war, 
insurrection or a natural phenomenon of an exceptional, inevitable and irresistible character, or (b) 
was wholly caused by an act or omission done with intent to cause damage by a third party, or (c) 
was wholly caused by the negligence  or other wrongful act  of any Government or other authority 
responsible for the maintenance of  lights or other navigational aids in the exercise  of  that  function.
S. Deakin, A. Johnston, B. Markesinis, Tort Law, 2003, p. 20-21. 
Ivi, p. 20.
W.V.H. Rogers, The law of tort, 1989, p. 14.
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dent man would not do19. Negligence is strictly connected to the institute 
of foresee-ability which represents the ability to see or know in advance 
the reasonable anticipation that harm or injury is likely to result from 
certain acts or omissions.  From this aspect the negligence can be defined 
also as a state of mind of a person who fails to advert to the foreseeable 
consequences of his conduct, as a reasonable man would have done20. Typi-
cally for the institute of negligence in Anglo-Saxon law is that except in 
bailment cases the graduation of negligence is rejected by nearly all courts 
because it adds difficulty and confusion to the already nebulous and un-
certain standards which must be exhibited to a jury21. The degrees of neg-
ligence in the bailment of Anglos-Saxon law were borrowed from Roman 
law through the case Coggs v. Bernard22 and given support by learned 
writers. There are  three «degrees» of negligence: gross negligence, ordinary 
negligence and slight negligence:  
- gross negligence; as it originally appeared, this was very great negli-
gence, or the want of event scant care. It has been described as a failure 
to exercise even that care which a careless person would use23. From 
the court practice are evident different elements in describing gross 
negligence. In the case of R. v Adomako24 the House of Lords agreed 
with the definition of  gross negligence given by the Court of Appeal 
which exposed three characteristics of gross negligence: (i) indiffer-
ence to a obvious risk of injury to health, (ii) or actual foresight of 
the risk coupled, either with a determination nevertheless to run it, 
or with an intention to avoid it, but involving a high degree of negli-
gence in the attempt to avoid it; or (iii) inattention, or failure to avert a 
serious risk, going beyond mere inadvertence in respect to an obvious 
and important matter of the defendant’s duty demanded of him.  
- Ordinary negligence; the omission of that care which a person of com-
mon prudence usually takes on his own25.
- Slight negligence; an absence of that degree of care and vigilance which 
persons of extraordinary prudence and foresight are accustomed to 
use, or in other words, a failure to exercise great care26.
The most general definition of strict liability in Anglo-Saxon law is liabili-
48
J.R. Nolan, J.M. Nolan-Haley, M.J. Connolly, S.C.  Stephen, M.N. Alibrandi, Black’s Law Dictionary, 
Sixth Edition, 1990, p.1032.
S. Deakin, et al., supra 16, p. 20.
W.L. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts, Fourth Edition, 1971, p. 182.
(1703) 2 Ld.Raym. 918.
W.L. Prosser, supra 21, 183.
(1995) in A. Mandraka Sheppard, Modern Admiralty Law, 2001, p. 339.
R.J. Nolan, et al., supra 19, p. 1034.
W.L. Prosser, supra 21, p. 183.
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ty without fault. In Anglo-Saxon law it was introduced by the case Rylands 
v. Fletcher27. In this case the court took a decision that anyone who in the 
course of «non-natural» use of his land «accumulates» thereon for his 
own purpose anything likely to do mischief if it escapes is answerable for 
all direct damage thereby caused. The concept of strict liability is applied 
in liability for animals, employers’ liability, vicarious liability and prod-
uct liability. The sole modern instance of a significant juridical creation 
of strict liability has been the American development of product liability. 
England has followed the same lines, but by statute.
4. The most discussed anglo-saxon institutes regarding the 
carrier liability by the continental  lawyers 
In the international transport conventions there are many Anglo-Saxon 
institutes regarding the carriers’ liability but, as mentioned, in the inter-
est sphere of the Continental lawyers are mostly those institutes which 
repressed a standard of conduct or a situation, where the limitation of the 
liability is no longer possible. One of the most frequent institutes of that 
type in the international transport conventions are: «actual fault or priv-
ity», «willful misconduct» and «recklessness». 
4.1. Actual fault or privity
It was not until well into the early 19th century that the idea of limiting liability for 
damages resulting from collisions began to temper the common law and the mari-
time law notion of unlimited liability28. The Merchant Shipping Act 1894 came into 
the force, which besides limitation of liability to an amount calculated by reference 
to a ship’s tonnage, contained the institute of «actual fault or privity» which repre-
sents the type of conduct which prevents the ship-owner from limiting the liability29.
 In the first international convention regarding the limitation of the ship 
owner’s liability the notion of «actual fault or privity» was not used but rather 
«obligations arising out of acts or faults of the owner»30, which can be easily 
(1865) 3 H & C 774.
C. Hill,  Maritime Law, 1998, p. 375.
Merchant Shipping Act paragraph 1, Art. 503: 
‘The owners of a ship, British or foreign, shall not, where all or any of the following occur-
rences take place without their actual fault or privity (that is to say),
- Where any loss of life or personal injury is caused to any person being carried in the 
ship, 
- Where any damage or loss is caused to any goods, merchandise, or other things 
whatsoever on board the ship; …..’
Article 2, 1924 Limitation Liability Convention.
27
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understood by Continental lawyers. The notion of «actual fault or privity» 
was introduced in international conventions by the 1957 Limitation Li-
ability Convention31. Whereas Convention 1976 on the Limitation of Lia-
bility represents a significant alteration from its equivalent articles in the 
1957 convention because it no longer uses the institute of «actual fault or 
50
Convention 1957 Article 1
(1) The owner of a sea-going ship may limit his liability in accordance with Article 3 of this 
Convention in respect of claims arising from any of the following occurrences, unless the 
occurrence giving rise to the claim resulted from the actual fault or privity of the owner: 
(a) loss of life of, or personal injury to, any person being carried in the ship, and loss of, or 
damage to, any property on board the ship; 
(b) loss of life of, or personal injury to, any other person, whether on land or on water, 
loss of or damage to any other property or infringement of any rights caused by the act, 
neglect or default of any person on board the ship for whose act, neglect or default the 
owner is responsible or any person not on board the ship for whose act, neglect or default 
the owner is responsible: Provided however that in regard to the act, neglect or default of 
this last class of person, the owner shall only be entitled to limit his liability when the 
act, neglect or default is one which occurs in the navigation or the management of the 
ship or in the loading, carriage or discharge of its cargo or in the embarkation, carriage or 
disembarkation of its passengers; 
(c) any obligation or liability imposed by any law relating to the removal of wreck and 
arising from or in connection with the raising, removal or destruction of any ship which 
is sunk, stranded or abandoned (including anything which may be on board such ship) 
and any obligation or liability arising out of damage caused to harbour works, basins and 
navigable waterways. 
(2) In the present Convention the expression “personal claims” means claims resulting 
from loss of life and personal injury; the expression “property claims” means all other 
claims set out in paragraph 1 of this Article. 
(3) An owner shall be entitled to limit his liability in the cases set out in paragraph (1) of 
this Article even in cases where his liability arises, without proof of negligence on the 
part of the owner or of persons for whose conduct he is responsible, by reason of his ow-
nership, possession, custody or control of the ship. 
(4) Nothing in this Article shall apply: 
(a) to claims for salvage or to claims for contribution in general average; 
(b) to claims by the Master, by members of the crew, by any servants of the owner on 
board the ship or by servants of the owner whose duties are connected with the ship, in-
cluding the claims of their heirs, personal representatives or dependents, if under the 
law governing the contract of service between the owner and such servants the owner 
is not entitled to limit his liability in respect of such claims or if he is by such law only 
permitted to limit his liability to an amount greater than that provided for in Article 3 of 
this Convention. 
(5) If the owner of a ship is entitled to make a claim against a claimant arising out of the 
same occurrence, their respective claims shall be set off against each other and the provi-
sions of this Convention shall only apply to the balance, if any. 
(6) The question upon whom lies the burden of proving whether or not the occurrence 
giving rise to the claim resulted from the actual fault or privity of the owner shall be 
determined by the lex fori. 
(7) The act of invoking limitation of liability shall not constitute an admission of  liability.
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privity» but the institute «recklessly and with knowledge that such loss 
would probably result»32.
 The words «actual fault or privity» infer something personal to the 
owner, something blameworthy, as distinguished from constructive fault 
or privity such as fault or privity of his servants or agents33. Under the 1957 
Limitation convention, the onus of proving that the loss occurred without 
fault or privity lies with the claimant, the reason for this being that limi-
tation under this regime is not as of a right, but a privilege, for which the 
party claiming limitation must first satisfy certain conditions.   
 «Actual fault or privity» should be understood as a linking of two no-
tions; «actual fault» and «privity». The first notion represents the per-
sonal fault which is imposed on the carrier; the second notion requires a 
little more explanation. If one is «privy» to something this means, gener-
ally speaking, that one has a certain knowledge, either confidential or oth-
erwise, of some relationship or agreement or situation existing between 
two or more other people. In other words, one could virtually but perhaps 
not entirely describe the word «privity» as being equivalent to the word 
«knowledge»34. 
 In the past when the owner of a ship was often also the master, the 
problem of deciding whether or not there had been actual fault or priv-
ity was very easy. The master was present all the time when the ship was 
sailing and all the navigational decisions regarding the ship as well as its 
commercial exploitation was his responsibility. In the modern day com-
plexities of large shipping organizations, subsidiary companies, consor-
tia, etc., it can be and very frequently is, extremely difficult to pinpoint 
whether or not the actual fault is that of the ship-owner himself or some-
body so closely identified with the company owning the ship as to be said 
to be a person who spoke and acted as the ship owning company itself or 
whether it is the neglect or default or act of a servant of the ship-owner35. 
 To establish whether the personal fault of the shipping organization is 
in issue the theory of alter ego was developed. It was first used in relation 
to application for a decree of limitation of liability under the provisions 
of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, by Counsel in Lennard’s Carrying Co 
Ltd. v. Asiatic Peroleum Co Ltd36 and later embellished by other cases. 
Limitation Convention 1976 Article 4:
A person shall not be entitled to limit his liability if it is proved that the loss resulted from 
his personal act or omission, committed with the intent to cause such loss, or recklessly 
and with knowledge that such loss would probably result.
W.E. Astle, Limitation of Liability, 1985, p. 2.
C. Hill, supra 28, p. 378-379.
Ivi, p. 378.
(1914-15) All ER Rep 280, HL.
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In Lennard’s the ship had loaded a cargo of benzene at Novorossiysk for 
carriage to Rotterdam. Shortly after passing Dover the vessel encountered 
a strong north-westerly gale with heavy seas and when she was off the 
Dutch coast she hove to and set her head against the gale to prevent  her-
self from being driven on to the lee shore, but she went aground because 
of insufficient power. She was unable to free herself and was subjected 
to heavy bumping causing the benzene to escape from the tanks and get 
into the furnaces with the result that the ship was set on fire and the cargo 
was thus lost. The appellant company, Lennard’s Carrying Co Ltd, was the 
owner of the vessel upon which the respondents’ cargo was carried. The 
ship was managed by another company, Lennard & Sons, where Mr. Len-
nard was registered managing director of the vessel and took an active 
part in the management of her on behalf of the owners. 
 The court held that Mr. Lennard knew, or had the means of knowing, 
of the defective condition of the boilers but gave no special instructions 
to the captain or the chief engineer regarding their supervision and took 
no steps to prevent the ship going to sea with her boilers in an unseawor-
thy condition. The House of the Lords held that Mr. Lennard was the alter 
ego of the company and as he could not show that he was not personally 
at fault, therefore the company was unable to limit its liability to the re-
spondents’ claim. 
 In the case Lennard’s Carrying Co Ltd. v. Asiatic Petroleum Co. Ltd the 
explanation of the notion «alter ego» of judge Viscount Haldane LC should 
be mentioned. He pointed out that a corporation is an abstraction. It has 
no mind of its own any more than it has a body of its own; its active and 
directing will must consequently be sought in the person of somebody 
who for some purposes may be called an agent, but who in reality is the 
directing mind and will of the corporation, the very ego and centre of the 
personality of the corporation.
 Another very important case regarding the actual fault or privity and 
the doctrine of «alter ego» is The Lady Gwendolyn37. The vessel Lady Gwen-
dolyn was in the ownership of the Arthur Guiness, Son & Co., concerned 
with brewing. Despite thick fog, the ship was proceeding at full speed 
with her radar operating but not continuously manned, and the Master 
only occasionally looked at it. The Master had been in the habit of sailing at 
excessive speed for some time and if the ship owner’s superintendent had 
examined the ship’s log, as should have been done, he would have discov-
ered that this was the case and would have reprimanded the ship’s Master. 
On basis of the presented facts the court decided that the plaintiffs were 
(1965) 1 Lloyd’s, Rep. 335. 37
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not entitled to limit their liability since their «actual fault or privity» had 
contributed to the accident. A reasonably prudent ship-owner would ap-
preciate the navigational problems involved in the use of radar in fog and 
would emphasize the vital nature of these problems to their ships’ Master. 
 In the case of the Lady Gwendolyn the court devised a two-part test to 
determine who in a corporate personality was the «alter-ego», the indi-
vidual «mirror image» of the company itself. The two part test was: 
- Who is or was the directing mind behind the voyage in question?
- If that person had acted as a person in his position should reasonably 
have done, would the accident still have happened38?
The response to the first question was the superintendent; the response 
to the second question was that he could have prevented the accident if he 
had acted properly. 
 One of the recent cases regarding the «actual fault or privity» was 
the case Grand Champion Tankers Ltd v. Norpipe A/S and others (The 
Marion)39. The vessel Marion attempted to weigh her anchor. She was un-
able to do so because her anchor had fouled an oil pipeline which ran from 
the Ekofisk Field through Tees Bay to Teesside. The pipeline was severely 
damaged. The owners of the pipeline and other companies who contended 
that they had suffered loss by reason of the damage to the pipeline claimed 
damages exceeding U.S. $25,000,000. The plaintiffs claimed a decree lim-
iting the amount of their liability in damages in respect of this incident 
to $982,292.06. They claimed that the Master had negligently used an out-
of-date chart which did not have the pipeline marked on it. The Admiralty 
judge hearing the application to limit initially granted limitation on the 
ground that the provision and maintenance of the charts was the sole re-
sponsibility of the Master and it was his negligence in using an out-of-date 
chart which was the sole cause of the damage/losses. The Court of Appeal 
reversed this decision on the grounds that it was the ship managers’ duty 
to ensure that there was an effective and properly supervised system of 
chart provisions and maintenance and such a system was absent in this 
case. The year before the owner was warned by inspectors about the out-
moded charts on the ship. This failure on the part of the ship’s manager 
was considered by the House of Lords to be directly causative of the oil 
companies’ losses, and furthermore the owners in turn were to be held le-
gally responsible for the negligence of their managers. On this basis the own-
ers were personally at fault and were denied the right to limit their liability. 
C. Hill, supra 28, p. 381. 
(1984) 2 Llyods Rep. 1.
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This last case very clearly demonstrates that effective management control 
is necessary to obtain limitation of liability. On the other hand, it is very 
clearly emphasizes a situation in which a master in large ship company is 
becoming less and less the «Master of his own little world»40. Although 
that is the reality, the court decided that effective control in matters which 
are connected with the systematic management of the company is neces-
sary. 
 In the United States the equivalent to the institute of «actual fault or 
privity» is «privity or knowledge». To ascertain whether damage was 
caused without «privity or knowledge» a «resonable man» test is applied, 
directed at ascertaining whether or not the ship-owner had actual knowl-
edge, or could have or should have obtained that knowledge by means of 
a reasonable inspection41. «Privity or knowledge» can be connected with 
ship equipment, diligence in selecting, training or supervising crew mem-
bers, or even in respecting the standard which must be present during the 
building or reconstructing of the vessel. In the case of the Marine Sulphur 
Queen42 the demise charterers and the owners were unable to limit their 
liability in respect to wrongful death claims against them. They were not 
able to show that proved unseaworthiness was not the cause of the loss of 
the ship with the resultant loss of life, and since they were considered to 
be personally at fault in that the reconstruction of the vessel had not com-
plied with American Bureau standards.
 The institute of «actual fault or privity» creates for the Continental 
lawyers a number of problems in defining its meaning, because it is an 
institute which was originally developed in the Anglo-Saxon legal system. 
When the 1957 Limitation Convention was being prepared, the Continen-
tal lawyers put forth the question of what this institute means. A delegate 
from Norway was against allowing the institute of actual fault or privity 
entering into the conventions, because it is a part of the English Law tradi-
tion. The Netherlands and Italian delegations proposed that the notion of 
«willful misconduct» or «gross negligence», which is closer to continen-
tal law, be used instead, but the English delegation disagreed43. The presi-
dent of the commission for preparation of the 1957 Limitation Convention 
explained that the notion «actual fault or privity» means personal fault, 
which is also known in the French legal system as the «faute personalle». 
C. Hill, supra 28, p. 383.
W. Tetley, International Maritime and Admiralty Law, 2002., p. 285.
(1973) 1Lloyds Rep. 88.
V. Filipovič, Neograničena odgovornost brodovlasnika u slučaju njegove osobne krivnje, 
1966, p. 214.
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At the end, after very fiery polemics, the final text of the 1957 Limitation 
Convention nevertheless included the expression «actual fault or privity». 
4.2.   Recklessness 
The institute of recklessness can be found in many international trans-
port conventions which were ratified by countries belonging to Anglo-
Saxon legal systems as well as by countries belonging to the Continental 
legal system. 
 In international conventions the institute of recklessness first ap-
peared in the Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of 
Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air, Signed at War-
saw on 12 October 1929 (The Hague Protocol to the Warsaw Convention 
1955) which in Article 13 defines reckless conduct with the knowledge that 
damage would probably result as a conduct where limitation of liability is 
not possible44. After the Warsaw-Hague Convention this institute also ap-
peared in other conventions45. 
 Recklessness is often bracketed with intention, which represents the 
state of mind of a person who foresees and desires a particular result. 
Foreseeing a consequence is the element which is common to both reck-
lessness and intention, but on the other hand there is an important differ-
ence. In the case of recklessness the actor does not desire a particular result 
that is not regarded as inevitable46. In theory recklessness is often defined 
as a state of mind accompanying an act, which either pays no regard to its 
probable or possible injurious  consequences, or which, though foreseeing 
such consequences, persists in spite of such knowledge; and it is empha-
sized that to be reckless the conduct must be such as to evince disregard of 
or indifference to consequences, although no harm was intended47. Indif-
ference to consequences can be found also in court cases. In Goldman v. 
Thai Airways International48, which represents one of the important cases 
treating recklessness in transport, the judge took the position that when 
a person acts recklessly he acts in a manner which indicates a decision to 
run a risk or a mental attitude of indifference to its existence.  
Warsaw-Hague Convention 1929, Art. 25: «The limits of liability specified in Article 22 
shall not apply if it is proved that the damage resulted from an act or omission of the 
carrier, his servants or agents, done with intent to cause damage or recklessly and with 
knowledge that damage would probably result; provided that, in the case of such act or 
omission of a servant or agent, it is also proved that he was acting within the scope of his 
employment». 
See point 4.1.1.
S. Deakin, et al., supra 16, p. 20. 
R.J. Nolan, et al., supra 19, p. 1271.
(1983) 1. W.L.R. 1186.
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For continental lawyers the institute of recklessness is mostly studied in 
their attempts to identify the analogy or difference between it and the in-
stitute of gross negligence. This question is for them very important be-
cause in continental law gross negligence is a type of conduct in which 
the liable person can not exclude or limit his liability49. From that point of 
view it is very important to determine whether gross negligence is an ana-
logical institute to that of recklessness, or whether the latter represents 
an institute which contains a higher degree of fault than the gross neg-
ligence. In such a case, according to Anglo-Saxon law and international 
conventions, which adopted the institute of recklessness, a carrier is in a 
better position than in Continental law, wherein the national legislations 
define the carriers’ conduct with gross negligence, when the limitation or 
exclusion of his liability is not possible. Till now the continental lawyers 
in their efforts to define the analogy or difference between these two in-
stitutes haven’t had easy work. One of the reasons is that in the Anglo-Sax-
on law few detailed studies regarding the analogy or difference between 
recklessness and gross negligence exist. That is one of the reasons why the 
Continental lawyers very often do not differentiate between the institutes 
of recklessness and gross negligence.  
 Those Continental lawyers who studied the institutes of gross negli-
gence and recklessness and also institutes like wanton conduct and will-
ful misconduct in a systematic way, classified these as semi-intentional 
types of conduct which can not be enacted with gross-negligence50. They 
came to such a conclusion because in Anglo-Saxon law the institutes of 
recklessness, wanton and willful misconduct are defined by some authors 
as «quasi intent» which represents a special category lying between in-
tent to do harm and negligence51. 
All three institutes exceed all the types of negligence, even gross negli-
gence. That confirms the comparison of the institute of gross negligence 
and recklessness. The last one is in comparison to wanton conduct and 
The provisions of that kind can be found in many legislative passages. Art. 276 BGB does 
not allow the exclusion of the liablity for damage caused by intent in advance.  Art. 1229. 
CC (I) defines that every agreement which exonerates or limits preventively the liability 
of the debtor in the case of gross negligence is void. Similary the Slovenian Obligation 
code in Art. 242 does not permit exclusion or limitation of liability when damage is cau-
sed by intent or gross negligence.  
B. Giorgia, «Recklessness» e previsione del danno nell’art. 2(e) del protocollo del 1968 alla con-
venzione di Bruxelles sulla polizza di carico, Il diritto marittimo, 1978, p. 162; I. Grabovac, 
Ograničenje odgovornosti u pomorskom poduzetništvu, 2001, p. 73-74.
One of the authors of Anglo-Saxon law who makes a very detailed study regarding negli-
gence and intent is Prosser, who could not arrange recklessness, wanton and willful mi-
sconduct in the group of negligence, because they contain some elements of intent althou-
gh they are not so distinctive as they are in real intent.  – W.L.Prosser, supra 21, p. 184.
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willful misconduct the closest to gross negligence, though it can not be 
submitted to it. In contrast to gross negligence, wherein the consequence 
is not desired, within the institute of recklessness the deliberate indiffer-
ence toward the consequence is already present52. 
4 . 2.1. Recklessly  and  with  knowledge  that such loss  would 
probably   result  
When speaking of the institute of recklessness in transport we cannot 
overlook the phrase «recklessly and with knowledge that such loss would 
probably result» or similar wordings which represents in several interna-
tional transport conventions the type of conduct in which the carrier can-
not limit his liability. As mentioned, this text first appeared in The Hague 
Protocol to the Warsaw Convention 1955,  and then  was slightly modified 
in other conventions in the sphere of maritime and air transport: Proto-
col to Amend the International Convention for the Unification of Certain 
Rules of Law Relating to Bills of Lading (Visby Amendments)53, United Na-
tions Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea 1978 (Hamburg Rules)54, 
Athens Convention Relating to the Carriage of Passengers and their Lug-
gage by Sea, 1974 (Athens Convention)55, Convention for the Unification of 
G. Boi, supra 50, p. 164; I. Grabovac, supra 50, p. 74-75.
Visby Rules, Article (5) 4:
5 (a) Unless the nature and value of such goods have been declared by the shipper before 
shipment and inserted in the bill of lading, neither the carrier nor the ship shall in any 
event be or become liable for any loss or damage to or in connection with the goods in an 
amount exceeding the equivalent of 666.67 units of account per package or unit or units 
of account per kilo of gross weight of the goods lost or damaged, whichever is the higher.
(b) The total amount recoverable shall be calculated by reference to the value of such go-
ods at the place and time at which the goods are discharged from the ship in accordance 
with the contract or should have been so discharged.
The value of the goods shall be fixed according to the commodity exchange price, or, if 
there be no such price, according to the current market price, or, if there be no commodity 
exchange price or current market price, by reference to the normal value of goods of the 
same kind and quality.
(c) Where a container, pallet or similar article of transport is used to consolidate goods, 
the number of packages or units enumerated in the bill of lading as packed in such article 
of transport shall be deemed the number of packages or units for the purpose of this pa-
ragraph as far as these packages or units are concerned. Except as aforesaid such article of 
transport shall be considered the package or unit.
(d) The unit of account mentioned in this Article is the special drawing right as defi-
ned by the International Monetary Fund. The amounts mentioned in h_visby/art/
art04_5asub-paragraph (a) of this paragraph shall be converted into national currency 
on the basis of the value of that currency on a date to be determined by the law of the 
Court seized of the case.
(e) Neither the carrier nor the ship shall be entitled to the benefit of the limitation of lia-
bility provided for in this paragraph if it is proved that the damage resulted from an act 
or omission of the carrier done with intent to cause damage, or recklessly and with know-
ledge that damage would probably result.
(f) The declaration mentioned in sub-paragraph (a) of this paragraph, if embodied in the 
52
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Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air (Montreal rules)56, Conven-
tion on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims, 1976 (1976 Liability 
Convention)57, United Nations Convention on International Multimodal 
Transport of Goods, 198058, International Maritime Organization Protocol 
of 1992 to amend the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil 
Pollution Damage of 29 November 196959, International Convention on Li-
bill of lading, shall be prima facie evidence, but shall not be binding or conclusive on the 
carrier.
(g) By agreement between the carrier, master or agent of the carrier and the shipper other 
maximum amounts than those mentioned in sub-paragraph (a) of this paragraph may 
be fixed, provided that no maximum amount so fixed shall be less than the appropriate 
maximum mentioned in that sub-paragraph.
(h) Neither the carrier nor the ship shall be responsible in any event for loss or damage to, 
or in connection with, goods if the nature or value thereof has been knowingly mis-stated 
by the shipper in the bill of lading.
Article 8 Hamburg Rules: 
1. The carrier is not entitled to the benefit of the limitation of liability provided for in 
article 6 if it is proved that the loss, damage or delay in delivery resulted from an act 
or omission of the carrier done with the intent to cause such loss, damage or delay, 
or recklessly and with knowledge that such loss, damage or delay would probably 
result.
2. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 2 of article 7, a servant or agent of the 
carrier is not entitled to the benefit of the limitation of liability provided for in arti-
cle 6 if it is proved that the loss, damage or delay in delivery resulted from an act or 
omission of such servant or agent, done with the intent to cause such loss, damage or 
delay, or recklessly and with knowledge that such loss, damage or delay would proba-
bly result.
Article 13 Athens convention:
1. The carrier shall not be entitled to the benefit of the limits of liability prescribed in 
Articles 7 and 8 and paragraph 1 of Article 10, if it is proved that the damage resulted 
from an act or omission of the carrier done with the intent to cause such damage, or 
recklessly and with knowledge that such damage would probably result. 
2. The servant or agent of the carrier or of the performing carrier shall not be entitled to 
the benefit of those limits if it is proved that the damage resulted from an act or omis-
sion of that servant or agent done with the intent to cause such damage, or recklessly 
and with knowledge that such damage would probably result.
Article (5) 22 Montreal rules:
The foregoing provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article shall not apply if it is proved 
that the damage resulted from an act or omission of the carrier, its servants or agents, 
done with intent to cause damage or recklessly and with knowledge that damage would 
probably result; provided that, in the case of such act or omission of a servant or agent, it is 
also proved that such servant or agent was acting within the scope of its employment.
Article 4, 1976 Liability Convention:  
A person liable shall not be entitled to limit his liability if it is proved that the loss resulted 
from his personal act or omission, committed with the intent to cause such loss, or rec-
klessly and with knowledge that such loss would probably result.
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ability and Compensation for Damage in Connection with the Carriage of 
Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea, 199660. 
The main question in the phrase «recklessly and with knowledge that 
(such) loss would probably result» is whether the knowledge should be 
objective or subjective and whether in the mind of the actor should have 
been present exactly such damage had been caused. 
Article 21, United Nations Convention on International Multimodal Transport of Goods, 
1980:
1. The multimodal transport operator is not entitled to the benefit of the limitation of 
liability provided for in this Convention if it is proved that the loss, damage or delay 
in delivery resulted from an act or omission of the multimodal transport operator 
done with the intent to cause such loss, damage or delay or recklessly and with know-
ledge that such loss, damage or delay would probably result. 
2. Notwithstanding paragraph 2 of article 20, a servant or agent of the multimodal tran-
sport operator or other person of whose services he makes use for the performance 
of the multimodal transport contract is not entitled to the benefit of the limitation of 
liability provided for in this Convention if it is proved that the loss, damage or delay 
in delivery resulted from an act or omission of such servant, agent or other person, 
done with the intent to cause such loss, damage or delay or recklessly and with know-
ledge that such loss, damage or delay would probably result.
Article 4., International Maritime Organization Protocol of 1992 to amend the Internatio-
nal Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage of 29 November 1969:
1. Paragraph 1 is replaced by the following text: 
1. Except as provided in paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Article, the owner of a ship at the time 
of an incident, or, where the incident consists of a series of occurrences, at the time of 
the first such occurrence, shall be liable for any pollution damage caused by the ship as a 
result of the incident.
2. Paragraph 4 is replaced by the following text: 
4. No claim for compensation for pollution damage may be made against the owner 
otherwise than in accordance with this Convention. Subject to paragraph 5 of this Arti-
cle, no claim for compensation for pollution damage under this Convention or otherwise 
may be made against: 
(a) the servants or agents of the owner or the members of the crew; 
(b) the pilot or any other person who, without being a member of the crew, performs ser-
vices for the ship; 
(c) any charterer (howsoever described, including a bareboat charterer), manager or ope-
rator of the ship; 
(d) any person performing salvage operations with the consent of the owner or on the 
instructions of a competent public authority; 
(e) any person taking preventive measures; 
(f) all servants or agents of persons mentioned in subparagraphs (c), (d) and (e); 
unless the damage resulted from their personal act or omission, committed with the in-
tent to cause such damage, or recklessly and with knowledge that such damage would 
probably result.
Article (5) 7, International Convention on Liability and Compensation for Damage in 
Connection with the Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea, 1996: 
5. Subject to paragraph 6, no claim for compensation for damage under this Convention 
or otherwise may be made against: 
(a) the servants or agents of the owner or the members of the crew; 
(b) the pilot or any other person who, without being a member of the crew, performs ser-
vices for the ship; 
(c) any charterer (howsoever described, including a bareboat charterer), manager or ope-
rator of the ship; 
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 Speaking of the knowledge of a reasonable person about the possibility 
of causing damage in terms of intelligence and ability to make a judgment 
of the possible damage, objective or subjective  criteria can be applied. Ob-
jective criteria are an abstraction of the knowledge of an imaginary person 
in a certain person on the basis of standards existing for a certain group of 
persons (pilots, drivers, doctor’s, etc.). Subjective knowledge on the other 
hand is taken from the aspect of an individual person who causes dam-
age. The knowledge of such person can be inferior or superior to that of a 
‘normal’ reasonable person. 
 The Anglo-Saxon legal system considers the subjective concept of 
knowledge. There are many points of view which try to sustain such a 
concept. The conduct which leads to damage and represents a condition 
for breaking the liability is the conduct of a particular person (be it indi-
vidual or the alter ego of a company) and not just any person in question61. 
Another argument is that the subjective element dictates the consistent 
use of the 1976 Limitation Convention, which is to award an almost un-
breakable right to limitation to the person liable. The fact that the 1976 
Limitation Convention has deemed it fit to place the burden of proving the 
requisite conduct on the party claiming full damage is also an indication 
that the right to limitation should be made that much more difficult to 
break. Finally, it could be argued that, read ejusdem generis with first limb 
(intent to cause such loss), the second limb recklessly and with knowledge 
must embrace conduct of the same ilk as that envisaged by the first62. This 
is echoed in the words of Kirby J in the Qantas case: “The extreme excep-
tions provide a clue, without more, to the high stringency involved also in 
the alternative ground of exception (recklessly, etc.)”63.
 The subjective concept of knowledge is very evident from the judg-
ments of Anglo-Saxon courts. One of the most known cases dealing with 
the question of whether the knowledge should be objective or subjective 
is the Goldman case64 wherein the judge gave a consideration that if the 
pilot did not know that damage would probably result from his omission, 
than it is not possible to attribute to him a knowledge which another pilot 
(d) any person performing salvage operations with the consent of the owner or on the 
instructions of a competent public authority; 
(e) any person taking preventive measures; and 
(f) the servants or agents of persons mentioned in (c), (d) and (e); 
unless the damage resulted from their personal act or omission, committed with the in-
tent to cause such damage, or recklessly and with knowledge that such damage would 
probably result.
S. Hodges, C. Hill, Principles of Marittime Law, 2001, p. 592-593.
Ibidem.
(1995) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 290.
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might have possessed or which he himself should have possessed. Such 
a position definitely demonstrates the subjective nature of knowledge, 
which was confirmed also by Lord Justice Purchase who in the same judg-
ment mentioned «actual knowledge» and defined it as a knowledge in 
the mind of the pilot at the moment at which the omission occurs and 
stated that art. 25 of Warsaw-Hague Convention includes only that kind 
of knowledge. The same position Lord Justice Purchase took in the Gold-
man case was taken in the case of Nugent and Killick v. Michael Goss Avia-
tion Ltd. and others65 where the court stated that article 25 of the Warsaw 
convention (The Hague Protocol to the Warsaw Convention 1955) does 
not introduce an imputed knowledge; it was not sufficient to show that 
by reason of his training and experience the pilot ought to have known 
that damage would probably result from his act or omission; the test was 
subjective; actual knowledge was required. 
 In some legal systems, like in France, objective knowledge is required. 
In the case Emery & Ors v. SABENA Belgian World Airlines the court held that 
aggravating circumstances that qualify the wrongful act are to be as-
sessed objectively having regard to the normal behaviour of a good pilot66. 
Very similar was the position of the court in the case Lamberth v. Guiron, 
where the court states that the actor must have been aware of the risk67. The 
French court persisted with the objective test even after the amendment 
to The Warsaw Convention by the Hague Protocol Protocol to the Warsaw 
Convention 195568. In the past also Belgium and United States courts had 
been practicing the objective test adopted by the French Courts, but today 
such a practice was been abandoned. The Belgian Court de Casation in the 
case of Tondriau v. Air India69 declined to follow the objective test adopted 
by the French Courts and required that the knowledge of the operatives of 
the air-carrier should be assessed subjectively. The same hapened in the 
United States with the case Berner v. British Commonwealth Pacific Air-
lines Ltd70 and in the Swiss with the case Lacroix Baartmans Callens Und 
Van Tichelen v. Swissair71.  
 There is another question which should be clarified and it is whether 
the damage which is in the mind of the actor should be particular. In an-
(1983) 1 W.L.R. 1186.
(2000) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 222.
(1968) 22 R.F.D.A. 184.
(1966) R.F.D.A. 448.
See Air France v. Moinot, veuve Saulnier-Ciolkowski & Ors, (1976) R.F.D.A. 105.
(1977) R.F.D.A. 193.
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swering this question the decision of the Court of Appeal in the Goldman 
case, which stated that the trial judge was wrong to have read the term 
«damage would probably result» literally to mean «any damage» should 
be taken into account. The Court of appeal was of the opinion that the 
damage of the complainant must be the type of damage known to be the 
probable result. This means that damage of any kind will not suffice. To 
disqualify a ship-owner of his right to limitation,  it has to be shown that 
he had knowledge that the particular (or special) damage would probably 
result from his reckless act72.  In practice it is extremely difficult for the 
claimant to prove such knowledge and this is also one of the reasons why 
this test is many times referred to as the “unbreakable test or limits” as 
opposed to “actual fault or privity”.
 The problem whether the damage is particular or not was present in 
The Hague Protocol to the Warsaw Convention 1955 because the text did 
not include the adjective «such». Several conventions which followed The 
Hague Protocol to the Warsaw Convention 1955 contained the adjective 
«such» and given the word combination «such damage» it became incon-
testable that exactly such damage as occurred should be in the mind of the 
actor. 
 From the above it is evident that a subjective conception of knowledge 
prevailed. The actor should have in the mind at the moment when an act 
or omission occurs knowledge of particular damage, which favors the ac-
tor and not the injured party, who has a difficult task proving subjective 
knowledge on the part of the actor. 
4.3.  Wilful misconduct 
The institute of willful misconduct today is not very frequently used be-
cause in the modern conventions it was replaced by the institute of «reck-
lessly and with knowledge that such damage would probably result». In 
the international conventions it was introduced by the Convention for the 
Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air 1929 
(Warsaw Convention 1929), representing the conduct of the carrier when 
he is not entitled to limit his liability73. The institute of willful misconduct 
has the same role in the Convention on the Contract for the International 
Carriage of Goods by Road (CMR)74.
The main question regarding willful misconduct is its nature. As with the 
346 F 2d 532 (1965).
(1974) 28 R.F.D.A. 75.
(1983) 1 W.L.R. 1186.
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institute of recklessness, the question of its legal nature is present - or bet-
ter said whether it is closer to intent or gross negligence. 
 In defining the nature of willful misconduct it is necessary to ana-
lyze some of the leading cases of the Anglo-Saxon court practice dealing 
with that institute. The definition most usually adopted regarding will-
ful misconduct is that put forward by Lord Alverstone, C.J., in Forder v. 
Great Western Railway Co.75 wherein he adopted the definition of «willful 
misconduct» declaimed by Mr. Justice Jonson in Graham v. Belfast and 
Nothern Counties Ry. Co76: Willful misconduct in such a special condition 
means misconduct to which the will is party as contradistinguished from 
accident, and is far beyond any negligence, even gross or culpable negli-
gence, and involves a person willfully committing misconduct knowing 
and appreciating that it is wrong in the existing circumstances, or failing 
or omitting to do (as the case may be), a particular thing, intentionally do-
ing or failing or omitting to do it, or persisting in the act, failure or omis-
sion regardless of the consequences. On the basis of this definition Lord 
Alverston continued: or acts with reckless carelessness, not caring what 
the result of his carelessness may be.
 Whether in any given circumstances the acts or omissions of a person 
entrusted with the goods or property of another amount to willful mis-
conduct must begin with an enquiry about the conduct ordinarily not ex-
pected in the particular circumstances and by then asking whether the 
acts or omissions of the person whose behaviour is called into question 
Art. 25. Warsaw convention 1929: 
The  carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself of the provisions of this Convention 
which exclude or limit his liability, if the damage is caused by his willful misconduct or 
by such default on his part as, in accordance with the law of the Court seized of the case, is 
considered to be equivalent to wilful misconduct.
Similary the carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself of the said provisions, if the 
damage is caused as aforesaid by any agent of the carrier acting within the scope of his 
employment.
Art. 29 CMR:
1. The carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself of the provisions of this chapter which 
exclude or limit his liability or which shift the burden of proof if the damage was caused 
by his willful misconduct or by such default on his part as, in accordance with the law 
of the court or tribunal seised of the case, is considered as equivalent to willful miscon-
duct.
2. The same provision shall apply if the willful misconduct or default is committed by 
the agents or servants of the carrier or by any other persons of whose services he makes 
use for the performance of the carriage, when such agents, servants or other persons are 
acting within the scope of their employment. Furthermore, in such a case such agents, 
servants or other persons shall not be entitled to avail themselves, with regard to their 
personal liability, of the provisions of this chapter referred to in paragraph 1.
(1905) 2 K.B. 532.
(1901) 2 I.R. 13.
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is so far outside the range of such conduct that it can properly be regard-
ed as «misconduct». An important circumstance in any case would be a 
deliberate disregard of express instruction clearly given and understood. 
Further, a person could be said to act with reckless carelessness towards 
goods in his care if, aware of a risk that they may be lost or damaged, he 
nevertheless deliberately goes ahead and takes the risk when it is unrea-
sonable in all the circumstances for him to do so77. 
 Definition of willful misconduct as it was set in Forder v. Great West-
ern Railway Co. in  its basic characteristics does not differ from the more 
recent definitions, which also emphasize that willful misconduct is a ac-
tion which goes beyond gross negligence when a person is conscious of 
his wrongdoing and persist regardless of the consequences78.
 In finding out whether willful misconduct is present each case where 
it is presumed present should be accurately studied before the conduct of 
the actor can defined as willful misconduct. In Laceys Footwear (Whole-
sale) Ltd. v. Bowler International Freight Ltd and Another79 it was stipu-
lated by contract with the carrier and forwarding agent for the transport 
of the shoes that, as the customer explicitly explained to the carrier, the 
goods should be delivered to the address which he gave him and that the 
driver should be instructed that he can deliver only to one address as ad-
vised. When the driver arrived at the destination he met two men who led 
the driver by their gestures to believe that the lorry was too big and that is 
was impossible to unload there. For this reason he followed them for three 
kilometers and delivered to them the shoes because he understood that 
they were the representatives of the shoes. The judge, Anthony Thomson, 
Q.C., held that the driver’s conduct amounted to willful conduct and for 
this reason the carrier could not avail of the protection afforded by arts. 23. 
and 27. CMR. That decision was overturned by the Court of Appeal which 
found that the conduct of the driver was only reckless, not willful. The 
The Thomas Cook Group Ltd. and Others v. Air Malta Co. Ltd. (1997) 2 Llyod’s Rep. 399.
In Horabin v. British Overseas Airways Corporation (1952) Lloyd’s Rep 450, Mr. Justice 
Barry stated: 
Willful misconduct is misconduct to which the will is a party and it is wholly different in 
kind from mere negligence or carelessness, however gross that negligence or carelessness 
may be. To be guilty of willful misconduct the person concerned must appreciate that he 
is acting wrongfully, or is wrongfully omitting to act, and yet persist in so acting of omits 
to act with reckless as to what the results may be. Consciousness of committing miscon-
duct must be present at the time when the person is acting or omitting to act. 
Mr. Justice Ackner in his judgment in Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd. v. South African 
Airways (1977) 1Lloyds rep. 564 exposed: …It is common ground that »willful miscon-
duct« goes far beyond any negligence, even gross or culpable negligence, and involves a 
person doing or omitting to do that which is not only the negligent but which knows and 
appreciates is wrong, and is done or omitted regardless of the consequences, not caring 
what the result of his carelessness may be. 
(1997) 2 Lloyd’s Rep., 369.
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court of appeal pointed out that the driver acted in breach of instructions, 
which the Judge found were clear and which he understood; a driver of his 
experience must have known that to allow persons whose identity he had 
made no effort to establish to unload the goods into an unmarked lorry in 
the road would expose those goods to risk of theft; his actions were delib-
erate in the sense that he plainly intended to do what he did even though 
he did not intend the goods to be stolen; but in the absence of any evidence 
from the driver to explain his conduct the Judges were entitled to conclude 
that he behaved recklessly.       
 In the case of Jones v. Bencher Ltd.80 a deliberate disregarding by a driv-
er of the EEC regulation which governs the length of time that it was per-
missible for him to drive was considered. He fell asleep at the wheel and 
the goods he was carrying were destroyed and it was found that this rep-
resented an act of willful misconduct. The same position was taken by the 
court in the case of Texas Instruments Ltd. v. Nason (Europe) Ltd.81 where 
the controlling director of the carrier was found guilty of willful miscon-
duct because although knowing the high risk of theft from an area, he did 
not appreciate that risk and insisted on leaving a trailer unattended in a 
car park in East London, even assuming that it was going to be picked up a 
few hours later.  
 When speaking about systematic studying whether in certain cases 
willful misconduct is present the case The Thomas Cook Group Ltd. and 
Others v. Air Malta Co. Ltd82 should be mentioned, wherein Mr. Justice 
Cresswell, influenced by the definition of Lord Alverston and in particular 
by the case Laceys Footwear Ltd. v. Bowler International Ltd. and Another, 
(C.A.)83 derived the following steps/propositions to ascertain whether a 
person committed willful misconduct:
- The starting point when considering whether in any given circum-
stances the acts or omissions of a person entrusted with goods of an-
other amounted to willful misconduct is an enquiry about the con-
duct ordinarily to be expected in the particular circumstances.
- The next step is to ask whether the acts or omissions of the defendant 
were so far outside the ordinary conduct in the specific situation range 
as to be regarded as «misconduct». (An important circumstance would be 
a deliberate disregard of express instructions clearly given and understood).
- It is next necessary to consider whether the misconduct was willful.
- What does amount to willfully misconduct if he knows and appreci-
(1986) 1Lloyd’s Rep.  54.
(1991) 1Lloyd’s Rep. 146.
(1997) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 399.
(1997) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 369.
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ates that it is misconduct on his part in the circumstances to do or to 
fail or omit.  
- What does amount to willful misconduct? A person willfully miscon-
ducts himself if he knows and appreciates that it is misconduct on his 
part in the circumstances to do or to fail or omit to do something and 
yet (a) intentionally does or fails or omits to do it (b) persists in the act, 
failure or omission regardless of the consequences or (c) acts with reck-
less carelessness, not caring what the results of his carelessness may be 
(a person acts with reckless carelessness if, aware of a risk that goods in 
his care may be lost or damaged, he deliberately goes ahead and takes 
the risk, when it is unreasonable in all the circumstances to do so).
- The final step is to consider whether the willful misconduct (if estab-
lished) caused the loss of or damage to the goods.
In the Continental law system there are different points of view regard-
ing the legal nature of willful misconduct. The most disputable are those 
which are often present between the Continental lawyers and are based 
on the interpretation by the suggestion of the words. They are based on the 
literal comparison of different institutes of the Anglo-Saxon legal system 
with institutes of the Continental legal system and then they by the sug-
gestion of the words define the consequences. This method is described by 
Bonelli when he mentions one of the possible conducts of the Continental 
law judge when he encounter the institute of «willful conduct» and the 
institute «recklessly and with knowledge that damage would probably 
result»: «The distinction therefore in practical terms would become very 
fine; it resides more than anything else in the suggestion of the words or 
in an indication of lines of tendency; if the formula of «willful miscon-
duct» is accepted, it is probable that the judges, especially those of conti-
nental law, will tend to interpret the norm in the more restrictive sense, 
in a manner, that is to say, whereby the carrier loses the benefit of the limi-
tation of liability only as sanction for the more serious misconduct (pre-
meditated or intentional breach of his obligation). Instead the formula of 
«recklessly and with knowledge that damage would probably result» is 
accepted, it is likely that the limitation is refused in cases of simple «gross 
negligence»84. 
 More realistic are these Continental Lawyers who start from the point 
of view that willful misconduct represents semi-intentional conduct which 
does not in any aspect reach the intention. Within the concept of willful 
misconduct they find the elements of intent, which are evident from the in-
tentional violations of the prescriptions and in clear provision of the conse-
F. Bonelli, Limitation of liability of the carrier: Present regulation and prospects of reform, Il di-
ritto marittimo, 1974, p. 85.
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quences of actors, although they are not really desired85. In this aspect will-
ful misconduct is that with a higher degree of fault like recklessness where 
mostly the indifference toward the consequence is present. Although in the 
Anglo-Saxon law and Continental law there are some efforts to find the dis-
tinction between recklessness, willful and wanton misconduct, these ef-
forts are present mostly on the theoretical level. In practice all such distinc-
tions have consistently been ignored, and the three terms have been treated 
as meaning the same thing, or at lest a coming out at the same legal exit86. 
5. Conclusion
The institutes of Anglo-Saxon legal system regarding the liability of the 
carrier are demonstrably particular, which is the main reason why it is 
difficult to find their correlative institutes in the Continental legal sys-
tem. Such a situation is the consequence of the separate development 
of institutes of both systems. In the 20th century there was significant 
progress toward unifying the law. A number of international conventions 
were adopted that facilitate solutions regarding the relationships of in-
ternational elements, but on the other hand created some problems when 
they contained institutes from one legal system unknown to the lawyers 
of other legal systems. 
 The institutes of recklessness, willful misconduct and actual fault or 
privity, which take part in many international conventions dealing with 
the carriers liability are institutes of that kind. The main mistake which 
is made by Continental lawyers is that they very often try at every cost 
to correlate institutes from the Anglo-Saxon legal systems to those of the 
Continental legal system although there exist differences which can not 
be ignored. From that point of view, the best way to understand these in-
stitutes, is to study and understand them as they are perceived in the An-
glo-Saxon legal system. Up to the present, any another comprehension has 
not appeared on the international level, and there are no prospects that 
this may happen. The main reason for that, is that in the last century the 
Anglo-Saxon law has had much greater influence on the Continental law 
than inversely, what is particulary evident in the field of the transport.  
See G. Boi, supra 50, p. 163. 
W.L.  Prosser, supra 21, p. 184.
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